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U.C.C. Article 9, Filing-Based Authority, and
Fundamental Property Principles: A Reply to
Professor Plank
By Steven L. Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr.*
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 generally follows the common-law principle that
one cannot give rights in property that one does not have (nemo dat quod non
habet). In many circumstances, however, Article 9’s priority rules, including its rule
awarding priority to the first security interest that is perfected or as to which a financ-
ing statement has been filed, trump nemo dat and enable a debtor to grant a senior
security interest in property that the debtor previously had encumbered. In this article,
Professors Steven Harris and Charles Mooney argue that, properly understood, the
first-to-file-or-perfect rule confers upon a debtor the power to create a security interest
in accounts and other rights to payment that the debtor has already sold and in which it
retains no interest. In doing so, they take issue with Professor Thomas Plank, whose ar-
gument to the contrary appeared in the February 2013 issue of The Business Lawyer.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent article in these pages, Professor Thomas Plank advanced an
approach toward the interpretation of Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”)
Article 9 that seeks to reconcile several sometimes-contradictory principles in-
herent in that Article.1 In 2011 we published an article that had a similar
goal.2 Professor Plank’s article takes exception to some of the conclusions that
we reached in ours, and we now wish to respond to those aspects of his article.
The subject at hand is Article 9’s priority scheme for resolving conflicts among
competing security interests. More precisely, the issue is whether and under
what circumstances Article 9’s first-to-file-or-perfect (“FTFOP”) rule3 confers
upon a debtor the power to create a security interest in collateral in which the
* Harris is Professor of Law at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Mooney is the Charles A.
Heimbold, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. This article benefited
from the helpful comments of Thomas Plank, Kenneth Kettering, Steven Weise, and Stephen
Sepinuck.
1. Thomas E. Plank, Article 9 of the UCC: Reconciling Fundamental Property Principles and Plain
Language, 68 BUS. LAW. 439 (2013).
2. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Using First Principles of UCC Article 9 to Solve
Statutory Puzzles in Receivables Financing, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 297 (2011).
3. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2010).
1
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399495 
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debtor retains no rights. The relevant setting involves security interests in rights
to payment: accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory
notes.4 Professor Plank agrees with us that at least one of Article 9’s priority
rules (namely, section 9-330) does confer such a power on the debtor, although
the statutory language is less than clear.5 Unlike Professor Plank, we believe that,
for many of the same reasons, such a power is also conferred by the FTFOP rule.
Professor Plank’s article clearly moves the ball forward and further illumi-
nates the operation and underlying policies of Article 9. Because we agree
with much of his analysis and many of his conclusions, we address here pri-
marily the points on which we disagree. Following some very brief background
on certain of Article 9’s underlying principles, we discuss the priority contests
whose proper outcome is the subject of Professor Plank’s disagreement with us.
Along the way we identify the sources and bases of our differences. These pri-
ority contests involve somewhat detailed facts and complicated analyses that
will be appreciated most by the cognoscenti of Article 9 priorities. For this rea-
son, and in the interests of space and convenience, we proceed on the assump-
tion that the reader has Professor Plank’s article and our earlier article readily at
hand. We do not repeat in detail the examples on which the relevant priority
contests are based. Nor do we replicate here the detailed analyses that our ear-
lier article provided.
II. ARTICLE 9’S FIRST PRINCIPLES
Professor Plank identifies and applies to his examples several important
principles related to the interpretation and application of Article 9. To facilitate
a comparison of our views, in this discussion we adopt his terminology for
these principles. Professor Plank first points to the “Plain Language Principle”
of statutory interpretation, under which courts normally apply unambiguous
statutory language according to its plain meaning.6 He next raises the “Coher-
ence Principle.” Professor Plank explains that, under this second principle, a
property-law regime should reflect “both the nature of the specific types of
property items and the nature of the specific transactions that the regulatory
regime governs.”7 Professor Plank also raises the important property-law prin-
ciple of nemo dat quod non habet (one cannot transfer more than one has) and its
corollary, the shelter principle (a transferee receives all that its transferor has).8
He recognizes the central importance of the exceptions to nemo dat such as the
4. For the definitions of these terms, see id. § 9-102(a)(2) (“account”), (a)(11) (“chattel paper”),
(a)(61) (“payment intangible”), and (a)(65) (“promissory note”).
5. Plank, supra note 1, at 498.
6. Plank, supra note 1, at 441.
7. Id. Professor Plank also invokes the “Certainty Principle” as furthering, or as a corollary of, the
Plain Language Principle because Article 9 generally “eschews indeterminate elements that increase
uncertainty and costs.” Id. at 447−48.
8. Id. at 441−42.
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“Good Faith Purchaser Principle.”9 Central to Professor Plank’s analysis, as well
as to ours, is another exception to nemo dat, the “Filing Priority Principle.”10
The extent to which this principle overrides nemo dat is the central disagree-
ment between us and Professor Plank. Before addressing the disagreement, how-
ever, it may be useful to consider an application of the FTFOP rule as an excep-
tion to nemo dat in a setting that is straightforward, clear, and noncontroversial.
This example derives from Professor Plank’s Example 3.11
On Day 1 SP1 files a financing statement naming D as debtor and covering an item
of equipment. On Day 15 D signs a security agreement granting to SP2 a security
interest in the item of equipment, SP2 gives value, and SP2 files a financing state-
ment covering the item. At this point in time, SP2 holds a perfected security interest;
but inasmuch as SP1 has no interest in the equipment, there is no priority contest
between conflicting security interests. However, on Day 30 SP1 acquires a security
interest (D signs a security agreement covering the item in favor of SP1 and SP1 gives
value), which is perfected by virtue of its Day 1 filing. SP2’s security interest was the
first to have been perfected. But because SP1 filed before SP2 filed or perfected,
SP1’s security interest has priority over SP2’s under the FTFOP rule.12
By the time that SP1 acquired its security interest, D’s ownership interest in the
equipment had already been diminished by the transfer of a security interest to
SP2. But by conferring first priority on SP1, the FTFOP rule nevertheless enables
D to effectively transfer more than it had—an exception to nemo dat.
III. THE PROPER REACH OF THE FILING PRIORITY PRINCIPLE
The Filing Priority Principle is implemented by the FTFOP rule.13 Its domain is
the resolution of priority contests among holders of conflicting Article 9 security
interests. A case for applying the principle exists when, under the FTFOP
rule, a financing statement filed in the relevant U.C.C. filing office by one person
(SP1) creates a risk to a potential secured party (SP2) that any future security
9. Id. at 442−43.
10. Id. at 443−44.
11. Id. at 457−62.
12. U.C.C. section 9-322(a)(1), the FTFOP rule, provides:
Conflicting perfected security interests and agricultural liens rank according to priority in time
of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the earlier of the time a filing covering the collateral is
first made or the security interest or agricultural lien is first perfected, if there is no period there-
after when there is neither filing nor perfection.
U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2010).
13. In our earlier article, we stated that a debtor’s power to transfer more that it has is “implicit in
the [FTFOP] priority rule.” Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 304. Professor Plank asserts that, in
this setting, “D’s power to transfer more rights than D has is expressly stated in the statute” and
so our statement is “not correct.” Plank, supra note 1, at 487. We suspect there is no real disagree-
ment here: Application of the FTFOP rule results in an exception to nemo dat. Whereas the priority
rule is expressly stated in the statute, a debtor’s power to transfer greater rights than the debtor has is
not stated in so many words. Rather, it is implicit in the priority rule, in the sense that it follows from
the result that the rule dictates.
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interest SP2 may acquire will be subordinate to SP1’s.14 In these situations, a
prudent SP2 would conduct a search of the records and, if the search revealed
a financing statement covering the collateral in question, take steps to address
the risk. A potential secured party that fails to search, discover a relevant filing,
and take appropriate steps should not be able to defeat an interest acquired by
the earlier filer.
A. PROFESSOR PLANK’S EXAMPLE 8: PRE-FILING SECURED
PARTY VERSUS LATER-PERFECTED BUYER
A principal complication in applying the Filing Priority Principle—and one
source of our disagreement with Professor Plank—is that holders of Article 9
security interests include outright buyers of receivables in true sale transac-
tions.15 Consider Professor Plank’s Example 816:
D owns accounts A1 through A10. On Day 1 SP1 files a financing statement covering
all accounts. On Day 15 D signs a security agreement pursuant to which D sells A1 to
SP2/B2, which gives value in exchange for A1. At this point in time D has no legal or
equitable interest in A1; SP2/B2 has become the owner. However, section 9-318(b)
makes it clear that because SP2/B2’s security (ownership) interest is not perfected,
D has the power to transfer rights in A1.[17] On Day 16 SP2/B2 files a financing state-
ment covering A1. At that point SP2/B2’s security (ownership) interest becomes
perfected and D’s power under section 9-318(b) vanishes. On Day 30 D signs a se-
curity agreement purporting to create a security interest in favor of SP1 in accounts
A1 through A10 and SP1 gives value.
Having lost the power conferred by section 9-318, does D retain the power to
transfer rights in A1 under the Filing Priority Principle? Professor Plank thinks
not. He argues that once D sold account A1 to SP2/B2 and SP2/B2 perfected its
interest, D had no interest in account A1 and so SP1 acquired no interest in it.
Professor Plank asserts that the plain language of the FTFOP rule does not apply
to this example, as FTFOP only applies to “[c]onflicting perfected security inter-
ests.”18 Because D had no rights in account A1 and no power to transfer rights to
SP1, SP1 never acquired a security interest in that account.
14. SP1’s security interest may already have been created when SP2 enters the picture. Or, it may be
created after SP2’s, i.e., SP1’s filing may have been a pre-filing. The text uses the term “subordinate”
loosely. If SP1’s senior security interest is that of a buyer of receivables, then SP2 would have no interest
in the collateral. Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 313−17.
15. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(72)(D) (2010) (defining “secured party” to include “a person to which ac-
counts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes have been sold”); see also id. § 9-109
(a)(3) (making Article 9 applicable to sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and
promissory notes).
16. See Plank, supra note 1, at 482−89 (discussing Example 8).
17. U.C.C. section 9-318(b) deems that, for certain purposes and with respect to specified types of
collateral, a debtor has rights that the debtor has sold. U.C.C. § 9-318(b) (2010). “As a consequence of
subsection (b), if the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, the seller can transfer . . . the account . . .
as if it had not been sold.” Id. cmt. 3.
18. See Plank, supra note 1, at 482−83; U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (2010) (governing priorities among
conflicting security interests).
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The distinction between a debtor having limited rights in collateral (as in Pro-
fessor Plank’s Example 3) and a debtor having no rights in collateral (as in his
Example 8) is the foundation of Professor Plank’s argument. This distinction,
under which the Filing Priority Principle protects a pre-filer against the holder
of an earlier-perfected security interest that secures an obligation but not against
the holder of an earlier-perfected security interest arising from a sale, derives
from nemo dat. But, of course, nemo dat does not end the inquiry. The proper
inquiry is whether and under what circumstances the Filing Priority Principle
is sufficient to override nemo dat to the end that a debtor acquires the power
to transfer more than it has, as section 9-203(b)(2) contemplates. If the principle
does indeed supply that power under the facts of Example 8, then D has retained
the power to transfer a security interest to SP1, the first-filed secured party, and
the FTFOP rule would award priority to SP1.
It is interesting that, in other settings, Professor Plank has little trouble with
the idea that a person that has sold receivables, and so retains no rights in the
collateral, nevertheless retains the power to transfer an interest in the sold receiv-
ables. He readily agrees that a person that has sold tangible chattel paper or an
instrument to a buyer that perfects its interest, and so “does not retain a legal or
equitable interest in the collateral sold,”19 retains the power to transfer an inter-
est to a subsequent purchaser that takes possession and otherwise qualifies for
priority under section 9-330.20 Section 9-330 addresses a priority contest be-
tween the holder of a security interest and a purchaser, which typically is a com-
peting secured party.21 Like the FTFOP rule, section 9-330 does not apply un-
less each of the parties holds a property interest, typically a security interest.22
Yet, in order to achieve the result that “the drafters of Article 9 undoubtedly in-
tended,”23 Professor Plank is willing to “boost” the language of section 9-330
with a “liberal interpretation” of the defined term “purchaser.”24 “[I]t is possible,”
he claims, “that the drafters meant the word ‘purchaser’ to include persons that
attempt to take an interest in property, even if the attempt is not successful.”25
More specifically, it is possible that the drafters intended the term “purchaser” to
encompass a person that would have been a purchaser but for the fact that the
collateral had already been sold.
One could, of course, “boost” the language of the FTFOP rule with a similar
“liberal interpretation” of the term “security interest.” As used in section 9-322(a)(1),
19. U.C.C. § 9-318(a) (2010).
20. Plank, supra note 1, at 497−99.
21. A “‘[p]urchaser’ . . . takes by purchase.” U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(30) (2011). “‘Purchase’ means tak-
ing by . . . security interest . . . or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.”
Id. § 1-201(b)(29). “Secured party” includes a person to which chattel paper has been sold.” U.C.C.
§ 9-102(a)(72)(D) (2010).
22. A “‘[s]ecurity interest’ means an interest in personal property or fixtures” and includes the
“interest of a buyer” of receivables “in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.” U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35)
(2011).
23. Plank, supra note 1, at 498.
24. Id. at 499.
25. Id. at 498.
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“security interest” could be interpreted to mean a security interest that would
have attached but for the fact that the collateral had already been sold.26 This
approach, which we advocate and Professor Plank rejects, is consistent with
the Official Comments, which take for granted that both section 9-330 and
the FTFOP rule confer upon a debtor the power to create a security interest
in collateral in which the debtor retains no rights.27 Ultimately, as Professor
Plank acknowledges, his unwillingness to adopt such an interpretation of
FTFOP stems from his inability to find a “very strong policy reason[]” for adopt-
ing that interpretation.28
Professor Plank’s Example 7 affords another example of his willingness to de-
rive the power to create rights in collateral from the Article 9 priority rules.29
This example concerns competing buyers of the same account under former Ar-
ticle 9.30 The facts are simple: After D sells an account to SP1/B1, D purports to
sell the same account to SP2/B2. SP2/B2 files a financing statement; SP1/B1 does
not. Under nemo dat, D would have been unable to convey to SP2/B2 an interest
in the account, which SP1/B1 owned. But, as Professor Plank explains, “[t]his
result . . . contradicted the entire purpose of including the sale of accounts in
Article 9 and subjecting such sales to the requirements of filing for perfection.”31
Accordingly, Professor Plank agrees that, under a proper reading of former
Article 9, SP2/B2 would enjoy priority under the Filing Priority Principle.32
26. The drafters occasionally took this “would-have-been” approach with the term “secured
party.” See U.C.C. § 9-513 cmt. 3 (2010) (stating that the term “secured party” is understood to
be the person named as secured party in a “bogus” filing even though the person may not actually
be a secured party).
27. Comment 4 to U.C.C. section 9-318 explains:
[I]n certain circumstances a purchaser who takes possession of a promissory note will achieve
priority, under sections 9-330 and 9-331, over the security interest of an earlier buyer of the
promissory note. It necessarily follows that the seller in those circumstances retains the
power to transfer the promissory note, as if it had not been sold, to a purchaser who obtains
priority under either of those sections. See section 9-203(b)(3), Comment 6.
U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 4 (2010). Comment 6 to section 9-203 indicates that the principle applies to all
of the priority rules contained in “Part 3, Subpart 3,” including the FTFOP rule:
Certain exceptions to the baseline rule [of nemo dat in § 9-203(b)(2)] enable a debtor to transfer,
and a security interest to attach to, greater rights than the debtor has. See Part 3, Subpart 3
(priority rules). The phrase [in § 9-203(b)(2)], “or the power to transfer rights in the collateral
to a secured party,” accommodates those exceptions.
Id. § 9-203 cmt. 6. The omission from Professor Plank’s article of any reference to either of these pas-
sages is notable.
28. Plank, supra note 1, at 499. We think such a liberal interpretation is wholly consistent with
Article 1’s mandate that the U.C.C. be “liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying pur-
poses and policies.” U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2011); see Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 305.
29. Id. at 476−79.
30. “Former Article 9” refers to the official text of Article 9 that preceded the 1998 revision.
31. Id. at 477.
32. Id. at 478 (“Choosing the Filing Priority Principle over the Plain Language Principle in these
cases would have been justified and appropriate.”). Revised Article 9 expressly allows for the correct
result. See U.C.C. § 9-318(b) (2010) (providing that, as against creditors and purchasers for value,
while a buyer’s security interest in an account or chattel paper is unperfected “the debtor is deemed
to have rights and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold”). “As a con-
sequence of subsection (b), if the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, the seller can transfer . . .
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We think that just as the first filer in Example 3 (SP1, which pre-filed) and
Example 7 (SP2/B2) achieve priority under the Filing Priority Principle and not-
withstanding nemo dat, SP1, which pre-filed, should achieve priority over SP2/B2
in Example 8. In our earlier article we explained in great detail why this result is
essential to the proper functioning of the FTFOP rule; it is essential that SP1 have
the ability to fix its priority date by pre-filing.33
Consider the ex ante situation of SP2/B2 as a prospective buyer of account A1
on the assumption that Professor Plank’s analysis of Example 8 is the appropriate
interpretation. SP2/B2 knows that if an earlier-filed secured party (such as SP1)
has already obtained a security interest (whether to secure an obligation or as a
buyer) then SP2/B2 will obtain either a subordinate security (ownership) interest
or (if SP1 is a buyer) no interest at all. SP2/B2 also knows that its interest would
be subordinate to an earlier-filed secured party’s interest that attaches after SP2/
B2’s interest if the purported “true sale” to SP2/B2 is recharacterized as a security
interest that secures an obligation.34 Under Professor Plank’s analysis, SP2/B2
knows that it will achieve a senior position only if it takes under a true sale
and if the earlier-filed party’s interest attaches after SP2/B2 acquires its interest.
Given this situation, we believe that SP2/B2 should (and normally would) con-
duct a search to determine whether such a potentially priming financing state-
ment covering account A1 has been filed.35 If SP2/B2 searches the records
and discovers SP1’s filing, it can refuse to complete the transaction, insist on a
termination or subordination as a condition of completing the transaction, or
proceed in exclusive reliance on D’s representations and warranties.36
Our differences with Professor Plank’s analysis are grounded not on differing
interpretive approaches but on policy differences. We base our more expansive
view of the Filing Priority Principle on the need to implement the policies under-
lying the FTFOP rule. Professor Plank’s approach, however, is colored by his
skepticism regarding Article 9’s overall treatment of receivables financing. Pro-
fessor Plank claims that Article 9’s filing regime is unnecessary for addressing
the account . . . as if it had not been sold.” Id. cmt. 3. This aspect of sales of accounts was “implicit”
and “obvious” under former Article 9. Id.
33. Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 318−19. SP1 also should prevail if it is a buyer of account
A1, in which case it would cut off SP2/B2’s rights entirely. Id. at 313−17.
34. The risk that a complex transaction will be recharacterized is not trivial. The case law distinguish-
ing true sales from security interests that secure an obligation is confusing and inconsistent. See Kenneth
C. Kettering, True Sale of Receivables: A Purposive Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 511, 515 (2008)
(“The courts have . . . been on their own in true sale analysis, and they have not fared well.”); Thomas E.
Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 287, 313 (1991) (“courts
do not use a consistent analytical approach when considering these transactions”).
35. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 607, 626 (1990) (“[I]t is the universally followed procedure for anyone who extends secured
credit or is concerned about collateral to search the UCC records.”). Of course, a person who is
not relying on the filing regime for perfection and priority may choose not to conduct a search.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-330 (2010) (specifying circumstances when a secured party or other purchaser
of chattel paper or an instrument that takes possession achieves priority over a conflicting security
interest).
36. See U.C.C. § 9-513(c) (2010) (specifying the circumstances when a termination statement
must be sent to the debtor or filed); id. § 9-339 (providing that Article 9 does not preclude subordi-
nation by agreement).
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priority contests involving receivables and that the Filing Priority Principle is
“not essential” and not required by—and, indeed, “violates”—his Coherence
Principle in the context of receivables transactions.37 Professor Plank also is
highly critical of the structure of Article 9, in that it defines a buyer’s ownership
interest in receivables as a “security interest” and considers such a buyer to be a
“secured party.”38 He is highly critical of applying FTFOP to receivables transac-
tions because a broad filing could hinder and constrain a debtor’s ability to enter
into later transactions.39 But this is exactly the result that the FTFOP rule is in-
tended to achieve, so as to enable the first filer to engage in future transactions
with the debtor with the comfort that its interest will have priority. The debtor’s
solution is to decline to authorize such a broad filing. In addition, Professor
Plank claims that, in the case of more limited filings, “the filing system is almost
useless in providing meaningful notice to subsequent purchasers.”40 He points
to the fact that in many situations filings are made against a given debtor by
multiple buyers of receivables and that potential buyers consequently rely on
their due diligence and on a potential seller’s representations and warranties.41
Nevertheless, the purpose of the FTFOP rule is to protect the first filer.
Professor Plank appears to draw his policy arguments from the Article 9 that
he would prefer to exist rather than from the principles underlying Article 9 as it
actually exists. Article 9 applies to sales of receivables chiefly to provide essen-
tially the same treatment for sales of receivables and security interests in receiv-
ables that secure obligations for purposes of perfection and priority.42 Professor
Plank’s preferred analysis of Example 8 would introduce strikingly different
treatment for sales in the context of the FTFOP rule. Given his skepticism
about the Filing Priority Principle for receivables, it is hardly surprising that Pro-
fessor Plank takes a narrow view of that principle as a means to confer the power
to transfer receivables to a first-filed party.
Although Professor Plank questions the utility of filing with respect to ac-
counts, the drafting history of Revised Article 9 suggests that the receivables fi-
nancing industry disagrees.43 Former Article 9 applied to sales of only chattel
paper and accounts, the latter being limited to rights to payment for goods sold
37. Plank, supra note 1, 444−45, 448, 469−73, 479, 493, 505.
38. Id. at 474−76; 495−97; see U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2011) (defining “security interest”); U.C.C.
§ 9-102(a)(73)(D) (2010) (defining “secured party”).
39. Plank, supra note 1, at 492−93.
40. Id. at 494.
41. Id.
42. We note, of course, that sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are perfected upon
attachment. U.C.C. § 9-309(3), (4) (2010). One benefit of providing the same treatment is that it
reduces the number of cases in which a transaction must be characterized as a true sale or a security
transaction. Drawing the distinction has proven difficult. See, e.g., id. § 9-109 cmt. 4 (referring to the
“difficult problems” of drawing the distinction, which in many commercial financing transactions
“is blurred”).
43. For a fuller discussion of the drafting history, see Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9
Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167 (1999), and Steven L. Harris & Charles
W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1369−73 (1999).
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or leased or for services rendered.44 Not very long after former Article 9 became
widely enacted, Homer Kripke, who had extensive experience in the financing
world, observed that the exclusion of non-sales- and non-service-related rights
to payment from the definition of “account” was an anomaly and did not reflect
the policy goals of the drafters.45 The Article 9 Study Committee of the early
1990s recommended that the scope of Article 9 be expanded to include the sale
of general intangibles for money due,46 and the Article 9 Drafting Committee
made the decision to apply Revised Article 9 to sales of these receivables early
and easily.47 As we have observed elsewhere, “[b]ringing [general intangibles for
money due] into Article 9 proved to be popular with those departments of a finan-
cial institution which handle securitization and other financing transactions such
as sales of credit card receivables. It would enable these transactions to proceed
with greater certainty, less risk, and less cost.”48
Of course, we recognize that the Filing Priority Principle should create the
power to transfer and override nemo dat “only when . . . necessary to promote
the policy underlying the [FTFOP] rule.”49 For example, it would not apply
to override nemo dat in the case of a priority contest between a security interest
44. U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1995) (specifying the scope of Article 9); id. § 9-106 (defining “account”).
45. Homer Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds, and Priorities, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 690−93 (1966). Mr. Kripke served as Assistant General Counsel at The CIT
Group, Inc. for seventeen years and as President of the Association of Commercial Finance Attor-
neys, Inc., from 1963 to 1965.
46. PEB STUDY GRP., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: REPORT 43 (Dec. 1, 1992) (recommenda-
tion 1.A.).
47. The biggest problem that the Drafting Committee faced with respect to this expansion was find-
ing a way to draft a narrow exclusion for loan participations. The two-fold solution was (1) to define as
an “account” nearly every type of payment stream the Drafting Committee could think of and (2) to
provide for automatic perfection of security interests in the residual category, which was denominated
“payment intangibles.” Compare U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995) (defining “account”), with U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)
(2010) (defining “account”). See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (2010) (defining “payment intangible”).
48. Harris & Mooney, supra note 43, at 1371. Professor Paul Shupack, chair of the ABA Securi-
tized Asset Financing Task Force, which advised the Article 9 Drafting Committee concerning secur-
itization issues, concludes that Revised Article 9 “accommodates the needs of those who do asset se-
curitization.” Shupack, supra note 43, at 181. He includes the application of the Article 9 filing system
among the principal benefits that the Article affords to buyers of receivables, id. at 169, observing that
“[c]ompeting claimants to sold accounts will be resolved by the simple rule that the first to file is first
in right[,]” whereas “[c]ompeting claims to sold payment intangibles,” which are perfected without
filing, “will lack the evidence given by a filing system.” Id. at 179 (footnote omitted); see also Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 950−51
(1999) (praising Revised Article 9 for “[e]stablishing clear and pragmatic rules for perfection and priority”
of securitized receivables). Professor Schwarcz’s favorable reaction to Revised Article 9’s treatment of re-
ceivables is tempered by his concern about the decision to deal with the special problems posed by sales
of loan participations by (1) defining as an “account” nearly every type of payment stream the Drafting
Committee could think of and (2) providing for automatic perfection of security interests in the residual
category, which was denominated “payment intangibles.” Id. at 955 (characterizing this “practical solu-
tion” as “imperfect”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Automatic Perfection of Sales of Payment Intangibles: A Trap for
the Unwary, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 273, 276−77 (2007) (“Automatic perfection makes it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to know one’s priority in purchased or pledged payment intangibles[,]” which in turn “undermines
the market for selling intangible rights and increases costs where sales do occur.”)
49. Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 318.
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and a buyer of goods.50 Article 9 distinguishes between buyers of goods and
buyers of accounts in several ways. Most relevant to the current discussion is
that buyers of accounts are secured parties, whose fate is intimately tied to the
filing system and to which the FTFOP rule applies. They can be expected to ap-
preciate fully both the need to search the public record before entering into a
transaction and the legal and practical implications of finding a financing state-
ment filed by a third party. Buyers of goods do not stake their claims in the filing
office. Their interests can be fully protected against subsequent claimants with-
out filing. Thus, where accounts are concerned, we would apply the Filing Pri-
ority Principle to yield consistent results in Example 8, in which a pre-filer com-
petes with a security interest that secures an obligation, and Example 3, in which
the competing claim is a security interest arising from a sale. Professor Plank, on
the other hand, would reject consistency in this setting but maintain consistency
between buyers of different types of collateral.
Finally, Professor Plank also argues that one reason for rejecting the power to
transfer to SP1 in the setting of Example 8 is that actual priority contests in that
context “will rarely arise.”51 He surmises that a security agreement in favor of
SP1 typically would cover receivables “now owned or hereafter acquired” by
D and explains that D no longer owned account A1 when D entered into the se-
curity agreement with SP1. We do not follow the reasoning that because the con-
tests would rarely occur the power should be rejected. In any event, we doubt
that Professor Plank’s point withstands scrutiny. We do not think the phrase
just quoted must be read to exclude from the collateral receivables that D has
the power to transfer, thereby limiting the collateral to that in which D has actual
rights. Courts construe security agreements under ordinary contract principles to
give effect to the intentions of the parties,52 and transactions in “all” a debtor’s
receivables typically are meant to be as inclusive as possible. We believe that a
court called upon to resolve this interpretive question might well do so in
light of section 2-403(1)’s version of the shelter principle (“A purchaser of
goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer . . . .”)
and section 9-203(b)(2)’s reference to the debtor’s “power to transfer rights in
the collateral to a secured party.”53
50. Id. at 318−19 (discussing the case in which a buyer buys and takes delivery of goods after a
financing statement covering the goods has been filed but before a security in the goods has attached
and observing that the applicable priority rule is section 9-317(b) and not FTFOP).
51. Plank, supra note 1, at 492.
52. See, e.g., 9A WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & FREDERICK H. MILLER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
[rev.] § 9-108:2 (2001) (“To a large degree, description issues arising from the terms of the security
agreement involve contract interpretation.”).
53. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1962) (first sentence) (emphasis added); id. § 9-203(b)(2) (2010) (empha-
sis added). We note that Professor Plank cites section 2-403(1) as an example of the shelter principle.
Plank, supra note 1, at 442 n.6. The shelter principle is not limited to goods. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris,
Using Fundamental Principles of Commercial Law to Decide UCC Cases, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 637, 638
(1993) (explaining that the shelter principle is a “fundamental conveyancing principle that predates
the UCC”); U.C.C. § 9-207 cmt. 6 (2010) (referring to the application of the shelter principle to invest-
ment property).
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B. PROFESSOR PLANK’S EXAMPLE 9: PRE-FILING PERFECTED
BUYER VERSUS PERFECTED BUYER
Professor Plank’s Example 9 is a variation on his Example 8.54 The facts rel-
evant to this discussion are as follows:
On Day 1 D signs a sale agreement providing for the sale to SP1/B1 of accounts to be
designated by D, D designates account A1 for sale under the agreement, and SP1/B1
gives value and files a financing statement covering all accounts sold by D to SP1/B1
under the agreement. On Day 15 D signs a sale agreement providing for the sale to
SP2/B2 of accounts to be designated, and SP2/B2 files a financing statement covering
all accounts sold by D to SP2/B2 under the agreement. On Day 25 D acquires ac-
count A2. On Day 30 D designates account A2 for sale under the sale agreement
with SP2/B2, and SP2/B2 gives value. On Day 35 D designates account A2 for
sale under the sale agreement with SP1/B1, and SP1/B1 gives value.
As with Example 8, Professor Plank’s analysis of Example 9 relies on nemo dat:
Notwithstanding SP1/B1’s earlier filing, once account A2 has been sold to SP2/B2
and SP2/B2 has filed, D has no more rights in the account and SP1/B1 accord-
ingly acquires no rights in it.55 Under this analysis the first buyer to acquire a
perfected security interest—here, SP2/B2—achieves priority. Professor Plank
correctly surmises that we would take the position that, by virtue of SP1/B1’s ear-
lier filing, D retained the power to transfer account A2 to SP1/B1 and SP1/B1
achieves priority under the FTFOP rule.56 As Professor Plank noted, we did
not address a scenario identical to Example 9 in our earlier article. However,
we did consider a similar hypothetical as a variation of our Example D.57 In
that variation we posited essentially this:
At T-1 SP1 pre-filed a financing statement covering all of D’s payment intangibles. At
T-2 D sold specific payment intangibles to SP2, whose attached security (ownership)
interest became perfected automatically. At T-3 D sold the same specific payment
intangibles to SP1.
In our view SP1 obtained its security (ownership) interest in the payment intangibles
free of SP2’s interest by virtue of D’s power to transfer pursuant to the FTFOP rule.58
54. See Plank, supra note 1, at 489−91 (discussing Example 9).
55. Id. at 490−91.
56. Id. at 491.
57. The discussion of Example D and its variations appears in Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at
309−18. The hypothetical referred to in the text appears at page 313.
58. Example D and the variation discussed in the text also raise an additional issue that is distinct
from the one under discussion: whether a pre-filing by a buyer of a payment intangible fixes the “time
of filing” under the FTFOP rule. We conclude that it does, id. at 309−18, and Professor Plank, in his
discussion of his Example 10, agrees. Plank, supra note 1, at 500−04. In both our initial iteration of
Example D and Professor Plank’s Example 10, SP-2 acquired a security interest securing an obligation
instead of the ownership interest of a buyer. Professor Plank concludes, through an analysis similar
to ours, that in this situation SP-1’s interest would have priority over that of SP-2. Plank, supra note 1,
at 500−04. Because SP-1 is a buyer, however, SP-1 takes free of SP-2’s interest in the payment intan-
gibles by virtue of its priority. Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 313.
U.C.C. Article 9: A Reply to Professor Plank 11
3058-182-02Harris-1pass-r02.3d Pages: [1–14] Date: [November 4, 2013] Time: [19:37]
Professor Plank disagrees with our conclusion59 for the same reasons discussed
in connection with Example 8.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION?
Professor Plank’s view is that “the best forum for resolving these issues [con-
cerning the Filing Priority Principle and the power to transfer] is a legislative
forum (a drafting committee or legislative committee) where numerous inter-
ested parties can express their views and advocate their solutions.”60 He also ex-
presses a “strong aversion to overruling the plain language of the statute to im-
plement the Filing Priority Principle by implication.”61 But we are quite skeptical
that a legislative solution is practical or likely, at least in the short to medium
term.
The U.C.C.’s sponsors recently completed a revision of Article 9 that culmi-
nated in the 2010 amendments to the Article.62 The bulk of the work was de-
voted to issues that appeared on a list formulated by an Article 9 Review Com-
mittee.63 The list included only one priority issue considered here: “Whether an
Official Comment should clarify how the priority rules apply to a security inter-
est that, under § 9-309(3) or (4), is perfected upon attachment and without
filing, but as to which a financing statement nevertheless has been filed.”64 More-
over, the general approach of the Joint Review Committee, which was responsi-
ble for drafting the amendments, was to limit the number of changes and, where
feasible, to change the comments rather than the statute itself.65 The Joint Re-
view Committee originally drafted a comment to make it clear that a pre-filing
secured party would win under facts similar to Example 8.66 It “later abandoned
any effort to deal with the issue,”67 in part because one of us (Harris, who was
serving as the Reporter to the Committee) expressed concern that a comment
might give rise to unintended consequences.68 Perhaps it would be feasible to
59. Plank, supra note 1, at 494−95.
60. Id. at 495.
61. Id.
62. For a summary of the amendments, which were approved in 2010, see UCC Article 9 Amend-
ments (2010) Summary, UNIF. L. COMMISSION, http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%
20Article%209%20Amendments%20(2010) (last visited July 8, 2013).
63. ARTICLE 9 REVIEW COMM., STATUTORY MODIFICATION ISSUES LIST ( June 24, 2008), available at https://
www.law.gonzaga.edu/files/Article9-StudyGroup.pdf.
64. Id. at 17. Professor Plank generally agrees with us that a pre-filing by a buyer of a payment
intangible fixes the “time of filing” under the FTFOP rule. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at
309−18; Plank, supra note 1, at 500−04.
65. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE ARTICLE 9, at 1 (May 27, 2009) (specifying standards suggested by the Chair of the Joint Review
Committee for proposing revisions of the official text of Article 9).
66. Stephen L. Sepinuck, Perfecting Article 9: A Partial Prescription for the Next Revision, 46 GONZ. L.
REV. 555, 559 (2011).
67. Id.
68. The concern was prompted in part by the fact that the addition of section 9-318, discussed above
in connection with Professor Plank’s Example 3, created its own unintended consequences. Read liter-
ally, subsection (b) would have precluded the application of section 9-330. These consequences were
addressed in the addition to section 9-318, comment 4, that is quoted in supra note 27. See EXECUTIVE
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attempt a resolution by means of a PEB Commentary,69 but the Permanent
Editorial Board for the U.C.C. has shown little inclination to address the
issue.70 Perhaps an evolving movement toward consensus and consistent analy-
sis through the academic literature is the most that reasonably might be ex-
pected. We are happy to participate in that process.
V. CONCLUSION
In this brief rejoinder to some of the points made by Professor Plank in his
recent article, we have reiterated our view that the FTFOP rule supports the im-
plication of a broad power to transfer. The power embraces a transfer to an ear-
lier-filed secured party in a way that overcomes the limitations of nemo dat,
which otherwise would protect the interest of an intervening buyer of receivables
that is perfected by a later filing or that is automatically perfected. While we have
referred readers to our earlier article for much of the detail of our analyses, we
appreciate the opportunity to respond in this journal.
Comm. of Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws & Permanent Editorial Bd. for the
Unif. Commercial Code, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Modifications to Official Text and
Comments (Dec. 2001). It may well be that teasing out the sale-related provisions and treating
them separately, as Professor Plank advocated, would have been more successful. However, the Draft-
ing Committee for Revised Article 9 rejected this approach.
69. See Permanent Editorial Bd. for the Unif. Commercial Code, PEB Resolution on Purposes, Stan-
dards and Procedures for PEB Commentary to the UCC, in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 1060 (Carol L.
Chomsky et al. eds., 2013) (providing for the issuance of PEB Commentary).
70. The PEB received a draft of such a Commentary from Professor Kenneth Kettering some
seven years ago. Memorandum from Kenneth C. Kettering, Assoc. Professor, N.Y. Law Sch. to Lance
Liebman et al. ( June 21, 2006).
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